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THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET DOMINANCE AND RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES UNDER 
GERMAN ANTITRUST LAW IN LIGHT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW 
 
Anca Daniela Chiriţă 1 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article analyses key features of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition 
(section 19), including the more severe provisions of section 20, and aims to discuss the 
economic freedom of competition approach to the abuse of a dominant market position. 
Furthermore, the article details with specific examples of abuse in cases heard by the Federal 
Cartel Office, with particular focus upon predatory pricing, cross-subsidisation, rebates, 
exclusive contracts, tying and bundling, refusal abuses, hindrance and abuse of economic 
dependence. Emphasis is placed upon differences in the implementation of antitrust law and 
upon answering the question of whether more severe rules bring about greater compliance. 
Finally, the article aims to examine both the differences in substance between German and 
European antitrust law, and the similarities and potential for convergence and 
harmonisation of the two. 
Keywords: German antitrust law, EC law, harmonisation 
 
A. COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF MARKET DOMINANCE 
1. Introduction, Evolution and Policy Objectives 
The German Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC) restricts the unilateral 
behaviour of both dominant undertakings in section 19 and non-dominant undertakings in 
section 20. The creation and strengthening of a dominant position falls within the scope of 
section 35. The main policy goals of the ARC are to protect the economic freedom of 
competition by maintaining the competitive structure of markets; to keep market entries 
 
1 Dr. iur (Europa-Institut, Saarland, Germany), lecturer in law, Durham Law School, UK. This paper is 
based on a previous conference paper and has been published in European Competition Journal, 29 (2008) 
3, 415 ff. 
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open; and to prevent the further foreclosure of markets by undertakings in a dominant or 
otherwise strong market position.2 
The economic freedom of competition is one distinct feature of German antitrust law 
developed by the Freiburg school.3 The ordoliberal thinking of the Freiburg School begins 
from the premise that the market order is a constitutional order. The central concept of order, 
Ordnung, is related to the concept of economic constitution in the sense of the rules of the 
game Spielregeln, upon which economic systems are based.4 Eucken aimed at developing a 
systematically integrated approach to the theoretical study and political shaping of the 
constitutional order from a wider social, economic and political perspective.5 Böhm, in his 
seminal book about competition and monopolistic rivalry,6 referred to the free market 
economy and the competitive process as part of an economic constitution, seen as a legal 
order but with an exact constitutional structure. 
As part of Böhm’s vision, Mestmäcker described the interdependence between a free 
economic order and a free political system as an attempt “to translate the philosophy of the 
classical economists from the language of economics into the language of law”.7 Accordingly, 
the essential means by which economic policy can seek to improve the economy is by 
improving the institutional framework within which economic activities take place, ie the 
economic constitution.8 In order to achieve their aims, both Böhm and Eucken considered 
that law and economics are indispensable prerequisites for the economic constitution,9 which 
would provide the basis for a free market economy. The free market economy is seen as an 
 
2 “Freiheit des Wettbewerbs” pleaded for a process-oriented, more dynamic competition and aimed at 
political and economic freedom. See, eg KP Schultz, in E Langen and HJ Bunte (ed), Kommentar zum 
deutschen und europäischen Recht (Neuwied, Luchterhand, 10th edn, 2006), s 19, 138. 
3 See generally F Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf: Eine Untersuchung der Frage des wirtschaftlichen 
Kampfrechts und zur Frage der Struktur der geltenden Wirtschaftsordnung (Berlin, Carl Heymann, 2nd edn, 
1964); W Eucken, Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie (Berlin, Springer, 8th edn, 1965); Böhm, 
Wirtschaftsordnung und Geschichtsgesetz (Tübingen, Mohr, 1971); Böhm and EJ Mestmäcker, Freiheit und 
Ordnung in der Marktwirtschaft (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1980); W Röpke, Die Lehre von der Wirtschaft 
(Bern and Stuttgart, Haupt, 13th edn, 1994).  
4 W Eucken, Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie (Berlin, Springer, 9th edn, 1989), 240.  
5 W Eucken, The Foundations of Economics: History and Theory in the Analysis of Economic Reality (Berlin 
and New York, Springer, 1992), 314. 
6 F Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf: Eine Untersuchung der Frage des wirtschaftlichen Kampfrechts 
und zur Frage der Struktur der geltenden Wirtschaftsordnung (Berlin, Heymann, 1st edn, 1933), IX. 
7 EJ Mestmäcker, “Competition Policy and Antitrust: Some Comparative Observations” (1980) Zeitschrift 
für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 387. 
8 W Eucken, Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Tübingen, Mohr, 6th edn, 1990), 378. 
9 For the concept of “Wirtschaftsverfassungspolitik” see, eg Eucken, supra, n 4, 240. 
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order of free competition in which all economic players meet as legal equals.10 Accordingly, 
the protection of individual economic freedom of action and of the competitive process 
constitutes the major goal of ordoliberal competition policy, and a value in itself as part of 
the overall protection of fundamental freedoms through the restraint of undue economic 
power.11 Hoppmann also focused upon the individual freedom of action, and the freedom of 
competition, Wettbewerbsfreiheit,12 is seen as a prerequisite for economic advantage, 
ökonomische Vorteilhaftigkeit. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is necessary to distinguish between the ordoliberal 
concepts of economic efficiency and performance-based competition. On the one hand, 
ordoliberals used economic efficiency as a generic term for growth and allocative efficiency, 
and economic efficiency is therefore an “indirect and derivate” goal.13 Not only Möschel but 
also Kerber considered economic efficiency as the outcome of the major goal of protecting 
individual freedom of action.14 Kerber also argued that economics has not yet developed 
normative concepts that can integrate these protected rights into a normative approach. 
Economic efficiency as an indirect goal does not mean that ordoliberals did not use economic 
models; for example, Eucken used the model of “perfect competition”,15 which was later 
rejected by Katzenbach,16 who defended the position that workable competition can only be 
achieved in a broadly oligopolistic market structure with a low degree of product 
differentiation. 
 
10 F Böhm, “Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung“, in  
F Böhm, W Eucken and H Großmann-Doerth (ed), Ordnung der Wirtschaft, vol 1 (Stuttgart and Berlin, W 
Kohlhammer, 1937). 
11 See, eg W Möschel, “The Proper Scope of Government Viewed from an Ordoliberal Perspective: The 
Example of Competition Policy” (2001) 157 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 4. 
12 E Hoppmann, “Zum Problem einer wirtschaftspolitisch praktikabelen Definition des Wettbewerbs“, in 
HK Schneider (ed), Grundlagen der Wettbewerbspolitik (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1968), 9; Hoppmann, 
Das Konzept der optimalen Wettbewerbsintensität: Rivalität und Freiheit des Wettbewerbs – Zum 
Problem eines wettbewerbspolitisch adäquaten Ansatzes der Wettbewerbstheorie, in (1966) 176 
Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 286. Cf E Kantzenbach, Das Konzept der optimalen 
Wettbewerbsintensität – Eine Erwiderung auf den gleichnahmigen Besprechungsaufsatz von Erich 
Hoppmann, in (1967) 181 Jahrbuch für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 193-41. 
13 Möschel supra n 11. Cf Posner argued that “efficiency is the ultimate goal of antitrust” law. See, eg R 
Posner, Antitrust law, (Chicago, 2nd edn, 2001), 27. 
14 W Kerber, “Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some Reflections of an Economist on the 
Normative Foundation of Competition Law”, forthcoming in J Drexl, L Idot and J Moneger (ed), Economic 
Theory and Competition Law, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, forthcoming). Available on 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1075265,  accessed on 1 October, 2008. 
15 Cf D Schmidtchen, “German Ordnungspolitik as Institutional Choice” (1984) 140 Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Staatswirtschaft, 22-78. Schmidtchen argued that Eucken’s “complete competition“ is not 
identical with perfect competition since what counts is the absence of coercive power. 
16 E Kantzenbach, Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs (Göttingen, Ruprecht, 2nd edn, 1967). 
The Analysis of Market Dominance and Restrictive Practices under German Antitrust Law in Light 
of European Antitrust Law                                                                                                         
4                                                                                                           
However, the most important feature of ordoliberalism is that, apart from the 
constitutional level at which political choices are made, for a well-functioning competitive 
market order, a sub-constitutional level is also required, ie a level at which individual 
players determine the rules of the game.17 The task of the economic constitution is therefore 
to create and maintain the rules of the game for performance-based competition, 
Leistungswettbewerb.18 On the other hand, the ordoliberal concept of performance-based 
competition, Leistungswettbewerb, ie competition in terms of better service for consumers, 
aimed to achieve “consumer sovereignty”19 to the largest extent possible, and contrasts with 
Behinderungswettbewerb as a concept, well known as hindrance abuse. Thus, the ordoliberal 
notion of the latter concept is that of “prevention-competition”, ie competition by means that 
aim to prevent competition from other producers, rather than to improve one’s own 
performance in the service of consumer interests.20 Vanberg considered “consumer 
sovereignty” to be a key criterion against which the performance of markets can be 
measured, and as the embodiment of performance-based competition, as a means to 
emphasise that the rules of the game should be defined and enforced in such a manner that 
better services to consumers is “the only route to business success”.21 From this perspective, 
the competition rules aim to ensure that the overall quality of performance determines the 
market success, ie profits and losses of firms reflect the relative quality of their performance 
for the benefit of consumers.22 Particularly because of its market outcome focus, Mestmäcker 
considered performance-based competition to fail to fit into Freiburg’s ambitious plans.23 In 
order to prevent the deterioration of competition policy and avoid dirigisme, the 
preservation of market structures compatible with effective competition is crucial. 
Hoppmann saw competition as a dynamic process and considered market structure criteria 
alone were not best suited to evaluating market performance, there was therefore no need to 
 
17 F Böhm, Reden und Schriften (Karlsruhe, CF Müller, 1960), 34-44, 67. 
18 Eucken, supra n 8, 266. 
19 Eucken, supra n 8, 43; W Röpke, A Humane Economy – The Social Framework of the Free Market (South 
Bend, Indiana Gateway Editions, 1960). 
20 Böhm, supra n 10, 107, 123-7, 153; W Eucken, “Die Überwindung des Historismus“ (1938) 62 
Schmollers Jahrbuch, 81. 
21 V Vanberg, “Freiburg School of Law and Economics”, in P Newman (ed), The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law, vol II (London, MacMillian, 1998), 172-9; V Valenberg, “The Market and State: The 
Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy” in (2005) 1 Journal of Institutional Economics, 39. 
22 Kerber, supra n 14. 
23 See, eg EJ Mestmäcker, “Competition Policy in an Industrial Society”, in Standard Texts on the Social 
Market Economy, (Stuttgart and New York, Gustav Fischer, 1973), 138-9. Mestmäcker considered that 
anti-competitive practices should be prohibited by rules that do not interfere with the effectiveness of 
competition. 
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accept restrictions upon competition that might negatively affect the market structure.24 
Hoppmann’s freedom of competition refers to the freedom to emulate the performance of 
competitors and to introduce innovation (Wettbewerb im Parallelprozess) and the freedom to 
choose one’s trading partner (Wettbewerbs im Austauschprozess). 
Effective competition based on performance, influenced by the ordoliberals, implies the 
analysis of efficiency-based defences of competition with the help of the structure and 
conduct of undertakings.25 Section 24 (2) provides that “competition rules are provisions 
which regulate the conduct of undertakings in competition for the purpose of counteracting 
conduct that violates the principle of fair competition or effective competition based on 
performance.” On the one hand, by not providing for a specific legal definition of what 
constitutes “effective competition based on performance,” a broad and flexible range of 
interpretations is allowed. On the other hand, the purpose of the provisions is to counteract 
potentially harmful conduct. However, while the above allows for a great deal of flexibility, 
the result does not clearly distinguish between conduct that is justified economically and that 
which is not.26 Additionally, there is a failure to deal directly with certain forms of harm 
covered by section 20 or those related to the restriction of competition.  
Performance-based competition has been a core element of economic freedom and a 
means of protecting competition against particular forms of harmful conduct to competitors. 
However, because of difficulties associated with accurately measuring the true extent to 
which a particular anti-competitive conduct caused harm to competition, the exercise 
becomes one of balancing the interests of the parties concerned. The conduct of a dominant 
undertaking is considered abusive if it impedes the ability of competitors to compete, and 
this cannot be justified by any resulting improvements in either consumer welfare or the 
structure or intensity of competition in the market. An objective justification therefore 
requires a comprehensive balancing, using a case-by-case approach, of the harm caused to 
competitors against the expected benefits to society of the economic consequences when 
harm to competitors clearly outweighs any such results. While balancing the interests of the 
 
24 E Hoppmann, Wirtschaftsordnung und Wettbewerb (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1988). In order to reduce 
legal uncertainty, Hoppmann advocated that restrictive practice should be prohibited per se. 
25 “Leistungswettbewerb” weakened the area of application of the ARC by favouring monopoly power. 
Since 1982, the emphasis has been upon a market-optimising antitrust. 
26 Further amendments in 1980, 1990 and 1998 added the provision that finds abuse when a dominant 
undertaking impairs without justification the ability of other undertakings to compete in a manner 
affecting competition in the market. There was no reference to the concept of performance competition or 
to its alternative, the balancing of interests. 
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parties, the economic freedom of competition and the aim of keeping the market entry open 
are considered paramount.  
The term “effective competition” means “substantial competition” (wesentlicher 
Wettbewerb).27 Substantial competition is in existence when competition eliminates the ability 
of any undertaking to act arbitrarily. Controlling the behavioural margin is a key criterion 
and therefore substantial competition is only workable28 when this criterion is fulfilled.29 A 
further structural criterion implies an analysis of the objective competitive requirements, 
while the market behaviour test has to prove how an undertaking uses its advantage within 
the relevant market.30 
The turning point in German antitrust law from a structure-performance paradigm toward 
a structure-behaviour one, with special emphasis upon keeping market entry open, “a 
commitment to open markets with free competition,”31 is also a point of convergence with 
European antitrust law.32 By contrasting the EC’s proposed consumer welfare-based 
approach,33 we can consider if the protection of competition is at the core of the economic 
freedom-based approach. The premise is the protection of competition itself and not of 
competitors.34 
As German antitrust law has a reputation for being particularly stringent, Section II will 
consider whether stricter rules are also a prerequisite for better enforcement. The Federal 
 
27 For alternative theoretical forms see, eg competition as a model of intensive competition (“intensiver 
Wettbewerb”) in H Härry, Die Intensität des Wettbewerbs: Ein theoretischer Beitrag (Winterthur, Keller, 
1954) or effective competition (“wirksamer Wettbewerb”) in E Käufer, Industrie Ökonomik: Eine 
Einführung in die Wettbewerbstheorie (München, Franz Vahlen, 1980), and as a model of pragmatic 
competition (“funktionsfähiger Wettbewerb”) whereas its goal is widened by a heterogeneous oligopoly 
see E Katzenbach, Die Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs (Göttingen, Ruprecht, 2nd edn, 1967); E 
Hoppmann, “Workable Competition as wettbewerbspolitisches Konzept“, (1967) Festschrit für T Wessels, 
145. 
28 Workable (“funktionsfähig”) competition of American influence is used as a pragmatic concept, since 
effective competition evolved into a more oligopoly-oriented concept and designates substantial 
competition. 
29 For substantial competition see, eg R Bechtold, Kartellgesetz, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkung: 
Kommentar (München, Beck, 4th edn, 2006), s 19 GWB, 69 or HP Götting, in U Loewenheim, KM Messen 
and A Riesenkampf (ed), Kartellrecht: GWB Kommentar (München, Beck, 2006),  para 27, 320. 
30 G Wiedemann, Handbuch des Kartellrechts (München, Beck, 1999), s 23, 26.  
31 N Kroes, “A renewed commitment to competition in Europe”, Speech no 07/689/2007. 
32 Case C-95/04 British Airways v Commission [2007] 6 CMLR 44, 1781-1816, para 106: “Article 82 is aimed 
not only at practices which may cause prejudice to consumers directly, but also at those which are 
detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure, such as is mentioned in 
Article 3 (1) (g) EC.” 
33 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, 
Brussels, December 2005, (“Discussion Paper”), para 4. 
34 See generally F Engelsing, P Marsden and D Müller, “A Bundeskartellamt/Competition Law Forum 
Debate on Reform of Article 82: A ‘Dialectic‘ on Competition Approaches“, (2006) 2 European Competition 
Journal, 214. Cf EJ Mestmäcker, Der verwaltete Wettbewerb: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung über den 
Schutz von Freiheit und Lauterkeit im Wettbewerbsrecht (Tübingen, Mohr, 1984). 
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Cartel Office (FCO)35 is the main executive body of competition policy responsible for both 
merger control and abuse of a dominant position.36 In terms of its general policy objectives, 
the FCO aims at restoring the competitive conditions that would have existed in the absence 
of the abusive behaviour, at seeking legal certainty, and at ending the infringement by 
keeping the right balance in choosing the appropriate remedy for the alleged infringement. 
2. To Whom Section 19 and Section 20 of ARC Apply 
Both section 19 and section 20 (1) apply to dominant undertakings, and correspondingly to 
associations of competing undertakings (so-called legal cartels).37 Dominant undertakings 
cover all natural and legal entities if and insofar as they are engaged in an economic activity. 
This functional approach also includes public entities that act in all matters of procurement. 
Even if the latter subject is only necessary for the fulfilment of sovereign tasks, the area of 
application is widened in comparison with Article 82 EC. Thus, section 19 does not apply if 
an undertaking enjoys superior or “relative” market power but is not dominant, while 
section 20 applies to both situations. Section 20’s target is the unfair hindrance of competitors 
and discrimination, and it can overlap with section 19, whereas a particular practice of a 
dominant undertaking that is generally abusive might hinder a competitor.38 
Furthermore, in order to keep the right balance in concentrated market structures, if an 
undertaking enjoys superior market power in relation to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), section 20 (4) is applied. Section 20 (2) 1 applies to undertakings whose 
suppliers or purchasers are SMEs that depend on them in such a way that sufficient or 
reasonable alternatives do not exist. The special feature of section 20 (2) is that it widens the 
scope of application of section 20 (1), thereby allowing intervention in cases in which SMEs 
are affected, even if they are exposed to substantial competition. For example, section 20 (3) 
addresses the prohibition of passive discrimination by undertakings with superior market 
power. 
Section 19 (1) applies to either suppliers or purchasers of certain kinds of goods or 
commercial services, while section 20 (1) applies to customers purchasing from them only 
insofar as their activities directly or indirectly relate to the relevant market in which they are 
 
35 The decisions of FCO “Bundeskartellamt” are available online at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/archiv/EntschKartArchiv/EntschKartell.php. 
36 The FCO set up the economic concepts project team “Projektgruppe Ökonomische Konzepte” to advise 
decisions on economic criteria that should influence the interpretation of the ARC. 
37 Within the meaning of s 2, s 3 and s 28 (1) ARC. 
38 Schultz supra n 2, s 20 GWB. See U Böge, “Dominant Firm Behaviour Under German Competition Law”, 
in B Hawk (ed), International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law (Huntington, New York, Juris 
Publishing, 2003), 141-53. 
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dominant. Section 20 (2) 2 provides for a presumption of a superior market position that 
applies only to purchasers. Thus, none of the prohibition of price discrimination applies to 
all suppliers.39 A supplier of a certain kind of good or commercial service is presumed to 
depend upon a purchaser if the latter regularly obtains special benefits from the supplier that 
are not granted to other “similar” purchasers. 
3. Common Features of Market Dominance 
Section 19 is in principle very similar to Article 82. The general clause of section 19 (1) 
prohibits only the abusive exploitation of a dominant position and not certain types of anti-
competitive behaviour. Under EC Regulation 1/200340 and section 22 (3) of the ARC, Article 
82 is also directly applicable. Abusive exploitation is not defined; instead, four examples of 
the section 19 (4) cover almost all types of abusive conduct. The concept of abuse implicit in 
these examples is designed to cover both the horizontal and the vertical aspect by addressing 
the exploitation of customers and suppliers on the one hand, and exclusionary practices 
towards competitors on the other. Hence, the special feature is having the structural abuse as 
a distinct form of abusive conduct. 
Exclusionary abuses include unfair hindrance and refusal to grant access to networks and 
other infrastructure facilities. The hindrance abuses of section 19 (4) 1 and 4 refer to the 
conduct of dominant undertakings that substantially impair competitors, customers and 
suppliers in their competitive activities without any objective justification, thereby affecting 
competition. Unfair hindrance of competitors in section 20 covers the situation in which a 
dominant undertaking or an undertaking enjoying superior market power hinders its 
competitors in the market through additional obstacles.41 The findings are restricted to 
practices incompatible with the principles of effective competition and resulting in further 
deterioration of the market structure.  
Market behaviour is only held to be abusive when it is objectively likely to have negative 
effects upon the hindered undertaking. This approach requires the determination of whether 
the behaviour constitutes competition justified on its merits. Therefore, the FCO has to 
balance all the interests of the undertakings involved, especially the economic and 
competitive interests of the dominant firm and its competitors. While balancing these 
 
39 S 20 (1)-(5) prohibit unfair hindrance and discriminatory practices of undertakings having dominant or 
superior market position, while s 20 (6) prohibits discriminatory practices by businesses and professional 
associations in their admission policies. 
40 According to Art 3 (2) 2nd sentence, member states may adopt or apply stricter national laws on their 
territory that prohibit or punish unilateral conduct by dominant undertakings. 
41 Schultz supra n 2, s 19 GWB, 130. 
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interests, the main purpose of the ARC is to ensure the freedom of competition in the market 
and to keep the markets open.42 No actual effects upon consumer welfare need to be 
demonstrated;43 rather, the abusive behaviour of the dominant undertaking must be likely to 
have an impact upon competition, particularly competitors’ conduct.44 Typical cases include 
rebates, tying or bundling, as is the case with Article 82 (2) d EC. Section 19 (4) 4 with its 
correspondent Article 82 (2) b covers specific sectors in relation to the refusal to grant 
another undertaking access to its own networks or other infrastructure facilities against 
adequate remuneration. The refusal to grant access is not abusive if the undertaking 
concerned demonstrates that, for operational or other reasons, concurrent use is impossible 
or cannot reasonably be expected. Objective reasons include insufficient capacity or damage 
to the effective functioning of the business. 
Exploitative abuse, dealt with in section 19 (4) 2, refers to the conduct of dominant 
undertakings that demand unreasonable prices or conditions from suppliers or purchasers 
that would very likely not arise if effective competition existed (the concept of “as if” 
competition). However, the absence of substantial competition does not always lead to 
exploitation. As in Article 82 (2) a, dominant undertakings cannot be forbidden from using 
their competitive advantage accrues from having attained such a position. The core aim is to 
prevent dominant undertakings from “exploiting” those dealing with them: for example, by 
increasing prices beyond a level that a competitive market would allow, or by forcing 
suppliers or purchasers to grant terms more favourable than those that would prevail if 
substantial competition existed.45 The findings for abusive pricing are based on a comparison 
between the actual market conditions and those conditions that would prevail if substantial 
competition existed by using the comparison market concept. 
Structural abuse, dealt with in section 19 (4) 3 and section 20 (1), is a particular form of 
discrimination and covers in substance the discrimination of Article 82 (2) c. It consists of 
discriminatory pricing or non-pricing terms or conditions for particular customers or 
suppliers without objective justification. The unjustified differential treatment dealt with in 
section 20 (1) occurs where an undertaking is excluded from or otherwise discriminated 
against in; business activities that would be “usually open” to “similar undertakings”. It 
 
42 P Ditze and H Janssen, Kartellrecht in der anwaltlichen Praxis (München, Beck, 3rd edn, 2007), 443-5. 
43 See for similar focus on likely effects in Discussion Paper, para 54 and 58. 
44 W Möschel, in U Immenga and EJ Mestmäcker, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: GWB; 
Kommentar, (München, Beck, 3rd edn 2001), s 19, para 117, 666. 
45 The basic issue is attaining the right balance between substantive competition and the FCO’s 
enforcement powers. Merely imposing a fine would restrict the FCO’s ability to prevent pricing abuses, 
conflict with the goal of protecting economic freedom, and would therefore be seen as economic dirigisme. 
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includes all practices that impose unfair hindrance and lead to the unjustified differential 
treatment of another undertaking.  
Apart from considering discrimination as a distinct form of abuse, the ARC distinguishes 
between hindrance abuses, as an upper form of discriminatory conduct applying to 
competitor-related cases, and unjustified differential treatment, which applies merely to 
customer/supplier-related cases.46 Discriminatory behaviour may imply an absolute refusal 
to deal with or to agree upon specific terms and conditions, or any other act by which 
another undertaking is hindered or treated differently. 
In order to determine whether specific discriminatory conduct is unfair or unjustified, a 
balancing of the interests of the alleged discriminating undertaking against those of the 
discriminated undertaking is required. Within the meaning of section 20 (2), discrimination 
is a differentiation without objective justification against producers of branded goods that 
refuse to supply to certain types of retailers in order to maintain the retail price of their 
products. The criterion used to evaluate structural abuses is the behaviour of the dominant 
undertaking in comparable markets.47 
The definition of the relevant product market is based on the same concept of demand 
substitution or functional interchangeability.48 The FCO and the courts tend to take a rather 
restrictive view of substitute goods and services thereby narrowing the product market and 
increasing the likelihood of market dominance. In GSM-Gateway,49 the relevant product 
market for call delivery services from national lines could not be considered a substitute for 
call delivery onto mobile phones. Otherwise, the customer would not be able to contact his 
desired call partner, and the conduct of the service supplier to grant the disposal for call 
delivery would not be exposed to any substantial competition in the market, since the end-
customers could not know the value of their calls to mobiles using a SIM card. 
The publisher Gelbe Seiten was found to be dominant in its distribution area in the market 
for advertising announcements in phone books, because due to their specialised content, 
Yellow Pages advertising announcements have no alternatives.50 The FCO identified the 
 
46 For example, a refusal to supply all retail dealers might constitute an unfair hindrance, but would not 
constitute unjust differential treatment that would treat all retail dealers alike. Both forms of 
discriminatory behaviour are subject to the same standards. 
47 See Discussion Paper’s “hypothetical as efficient” competitor test, para 63. 
48 Wiedemann, supra n 30, 9-13. W Fikentscher, “Mehrzielige Marktwirtschaft subjektiver Märkte: Wieder 
das Europa- und das Weltmarktargument” (1996) Festschrift Mestmäcker, 567-78. 
49 KG GSM-Gateway [2004] WuW/E DE-R 1274; HRC Düsseldorf VI-U (Kart) 35/03 call media services v 
Vodafone [2004]; HRC Düsseldorf SIM-Karten [2005] WuW/E DE-R 1577; HRC München GSM-Wandler 
[2004] WuW/E DE-R 1270. 
50 FCJ Vorleistungspflicht [2002] WuW/E DE-R 1051. 
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market for TV advertising, where RTL and Pro7Sat1 held a dominant position,51 and the 
primary market for carbonator kits and the after-market for refilling cylinders, where Soda 
Club was dominant.52 Consumers who bought the carbonator kit would lose part of their 
initial investment by not pursuing the “lock-in-effect” refill strategy, as once the consumer 
has decided in favour of one system their freedom of choice is significantly reduced (ie the 
consumer is a captive customer). However, the court53 considered demand substitution as 
merely an “ancillary criterion” and used the functional approach, holding that Soda Club 
was able to develop a distinctive competitive strategy in the segment of refilling the CO2 
cylinders as an independent sub-market. Due to technical developments, car producers are 
dominant in the market for motor vehicle servicing, as only certain manufacturers are 
specialised for a certain brand of car.54 Football associations are dominant in the market for 
football game marketing vis-à-vis advertising media, because due to their popularity in the 
media, they are not substitutable.55 
The relevant geographical market encompasses the area in which the undertaking is active 
and the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous, and can be limited to 
neighbouring areas. Actual or potential competition from undertakings active abroad is 
taken into account. Previously, the Federal Court of Justice (FCJ)56 restricted the definition of 
the relevant geographic market to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, even if 
economic data showed a cross-border market. Thus, this view was narrowed further,57 
whereas the physical boundaries are not decisive. The local market is narrowed if 
undertakings operate within limited boundaries due to transportation costs, feasibilities or 
other restricting factors.58 A distance energy supplier was not dominant vis-à-vis end-
consumers, even if it was the only supplier in the relevant geographical market.59 Another 
 
51 FCO RTL & Pro7Sat1 press release, 30 November 2007. 
52 FCO B 3-39/03 Soda Club [2006]; R Podszun, “A Sparkling Decision: Property Rights and Competition 
Law in a German Abuse Case” (2007) 28 European Competition Law Review, 695-9. 
53 HRC Düsseldorf VI-Kart-5/06 (V) Soda Club [2007], para 36. 
54 HRC Stuttgart 2 U 202/03 Mandl&Dreyer v DaimlerChrysler [2004] in S Hossenfelder, W Töllner and K 
Ost, Kartellrechtspraxis and Kartellrechtsprechung 2005/2006 (Köln, RWS Verlag, 21nd edn, 2006), para 
196. 
55 FCJ Hörfunkrechte [2005] WuW/E DE-R 1597. 
56 FCJ Backofenmarkt [1995] WuW/E 3026, 3029. Supra n 30, s 23, 12. 
57 FCJ KVR 1403 Staubsaugerbeutelmarkt [2004] in C Burholt, “Auswirkungen des BGH-Beschlusses 
"Staubsauger-beutelmarkt" auf die Bagatellmarktklausel“ (2005) 9 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 889-99. 
58 KG Bituminöses Mischgut WuW/E 2093; KG Rewe/Florimex WuW/E 2862; KG HaGE/Kiel WuW/E 5364, 
5371. 
59 HRC Düsseldorf VI-U (Kart) 19/04 Fernwärme Kamp-Lintfort [2005] in Hossenfelder, supra n 54,para 
181. 
The Analysis of Market Dominance and Restrictive Practices under German Antitrust Law in Light 
of European Antitrust Law                                                                                                         
12                                                                                                           
supplier was found to be dominant at least vis-à-vis intermediary suppliers when it held a 
natural monopoly position due to transport possibilities.60 
4. Distinctive Features of Market Dominance 
There are several features by which market dominance can be recognised. Firstly, the legal 
definition of dominance, in contrast to the EC’s jurisprudential definition,61 presents three 
forms of market dominance, which are independently applicable. Section 19 (2) contains the 
basic standard for evaluating a dominant market position as the situation in which an 
undertaking has no competitors (monopoly), is not exposed to any substantial competition 
(quasi-monopoly), or has a paramount market position in relation to its competitors. 
Whether the undertaking is subject to substantial competition depends upon how far it can 
act in the relevant market independently of its competitors, suppliers or customers. 
However, even if an undertaking is exposed to substantial competition in the relevant 
market, it can still have a paramount market position. 
Secondly, the presumptions of market dominance extend the area of application of section 
19. Moreover, section 19 (3) sets forth two refutable presumptions of market dominance62 
based on market share thresholds that are slightly lower than those developed by the ECJ.63 
In the case of monopoly, the undertaking is presumed to have a dominant position if it has a 
market share of 33% or more. In the case of oligopoly, dominance is presumed if three or 
fewer undertakings have a combined market share of 50% or more, or if five or fewer 
undertakings have a combined market share of 66% or more. The undertaking concerned 
may rebut the oligopoly presumption, but the rebuttal has to be based on the anticipated 
market structure. It is not sufficient to demonstrate that substantial competition between the 
oligopolies will prevail in the future; rather, it must be demonstrated that it will lead to 
substantial competition between the oligopoly and its competitors. The actual and past 
market behaviour of competitors can indicate whether and to what extent a given market 
structure permits the expectation of prevailing substantial competition. The FCO is obliged 
to thoroughly investigate ex officio the market position of the undertaking concerned, as well 
as the overall competitive conditions, and it may only rely on the above presumptions when 
the findings are inconclusive. 
 
60 HRC Naumburg 1 U (Kart) 6/05 Fernwärme Halle [2005] in Hossenfelder supra n 59, para 182.  
61 See generally R Whish, Competition Law (Oxford University Press, 5th edn, 2005) 179. Case T-340/03 
France Télécom SA (formerly Wanadoo) v Commission [2007] 4 CMLR 21, para 99. 
62 The presumptions apply also to collective dominance and mergers. 
63 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359; Case T-221/95 Endemol v Commission [1999] ECR 
II 1299, 134; Case T-219/99 British Airways v Commission [2004] 4 CMLR 1008, 211; Commission decision 
Microsoft COMP/C3/37792 [2007] OJ L 32/23, 28. 
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Thirdly, the existence of the legal criteria64 of section 19 (2) 2 to assess dominance requires 
a thorough analysis of the market structure as well as of market behaviour.65 Market shares 
are an important indicator but are not considered per se. In practice, the identification of a 
paramount position is based on finding a large market share and on outstanding financial 
resources. For example, if the mere size of a paramount market power relative to the market 
shares of the next largest competitors was sufficient,66 such a paramount position alone, even 
in the presence of substantial competition, cannot be justified and all other circumstances 
must be evaluated,67 including superior market power due to the size, market shares and 
financial resources.68 The fact that certain products are part of a group of products that a 
retailer almost inevitably needs in order to be able to offer a full product range to end-
consumers is sufficient for finding relative market power; for example, a company having a 
market share of 18% fulfilled the threshold of relative market power.69 A subsidiary of 
Deutsche Telekom, together with local editors of the formerly official telephone book (Das 
Telefonbuch, Das Örtliche), held relative market power.70 Deutsche Telekom held a 
dominant market position in the national phone line market and relative market power vis-à-
vis its competitor, Neumann Verlag.71 
The concept of financial power led to the development of the theory of deterrence, 
according to which market dominance provides an undertaking with behavioural leeway 
that makes it possible to dampen actual or potential smaller competitors, or to deter them 
through an aggressive competition policy.72 Only the exchange of goods or commercial 
services between non-affiliated undertakings is considered, while captive markets are 
disregarded.73 
 
64 Accordingly, the legal criteria are the market share, financial power, access to supply or markets, links 
with other undertakings, legal or factual barriers to market entry, actual or potential competitors, ability 
to shift supply or demand to other goods or commercial services, and the ability of the opposite market 
side to resort to other undertakings. 
65 FCJ Backofenmarkt [1995] WuW/E 3026. 
66 FCJ Valium I [1976] WuW/E 1445. 
67 FCJ Klöckner-Becorit [1980] WuW/E 1749. 
68 FCJ Wal*Mart [2002] WuW/E DE-R 1042, 1049. 
69 FCJ Lancaster KZR 2/02 [2003] (2004) 25 ECLR 11, 177-8. 
70 FCJ Sparberaterin I [2003] WuW/E DE-R 1377, upheld by FCJ KZR 2/04 Sparberaterin II [2005] in 
Hossenfelder, supra n 54, para 314. 
71 HRC Celle 13 U (Kart) 143/00 Deutsche Telekom v Neumann Verlag [2005] in Hossenfelder, supra n 54, 
para 188 ; FCJ Der Oberhammer KZ R1/03 [2004] WuW/E DE-R 1283. 
72 FCJ Kfz-Kupplungen [1978] WuW/E 1509. 
73 Ibid n 72, 1501,1503. 
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Due to its large financial resources and significant economies of scale, the bonus system 
practised by a company holding a paramount market power74 was more attractive than that 
of its competitors, forcing their customers to concentrate their demand on one supplier and 
thereby preventing them from switching to other suppliers. Fuchs held a dominant position 
in the market for dried spices and herbs, with a market share of 75%, due to its overall 
financial power as producer of a famous brand of condiment ingredients and its good access 
to the supply markets, which led to a competitive advantage.75 
Fourthly, oligopolies (two or more undertakings) hold a dominant position if there is no 
substantial competition between the members of the oligopoly and if the oligopoly itself has 
a dominant or a paramount market position in relation to its competitors.76 In the case of 
collective dominance, two conditions must be fulfilled cumulatively.77 If there are no smaller 
competitors in the market, the FCO must establish whether substantial competition exists 
between the allegedly oligopolistic undertakings (“inside competition”), and must examine 
further whether this entity, if it were one single undertaking and exposed to actual 
competition from smaller competitors, would enjoy a dominant market position (“outside 
competition”). Only in the absence of substantial competition may the FCO treat the 
undertakings as one single entity.  
Pro7Sat1 and the RTL Group together held a dominant position (non-competitive 
duopoly) in the TV advertising market, with a constant market share of approximately 40% 
each in the absence of any substantial competition from outside.78 RWE and E.ON together 
hold a dominant position in the national electricity market, as there is no substantial 
competition between them and they have a paramount market power in relation to their 
competitors.79 Between them, the companies produce around 60% of the net electricity 
generated and control more than 50-70% of the German electricity networks. The regional 
lottery companies, German Lotto and Toto Block, were jointly dominant in the German 
market for commercial lottery services.80 They abused their dominant position by hindering 
 
74 KG Fertigfutter [1980] WuW/E 2403. 
75 FCO B 2-12/00 Fuchs v Teuto [2002], para 32. 
76 S 19 (2) 2 ARC. 
77 Ditze, supra n 42, 429. 
78 FCO, press release, 11 November 2007. See also OECD, Annual Report on Competition Policy 
Developments in Germany, DAF/COMP (2006) 21/01, 63. 
79 FCO B 8-88/05-02 RWE [2007]. 
80 FCO B 10-148/05 DLTB & Landeslottogesellschaften [2006], paras 503 and 507.  
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lottery agents from establishing stationary lottery collection points (the classic allocation of 
territory).81 
5. Remedies and Penalties 
Contracts that are based on or constitute an abuse of a dominant position are null and 
void.82 Pursuant to section 32 ARC, the competition authorities may impose all the measures 
that are necessary to effectively bring the infringement to an end. Third parties cannot 
intervene against abusive practices, but they may introduce civil actions to obtain injunctive 
relief or recover the actual damages incurred because of such practices if deliberate or 
negligent behaviour exists.83 Punitive damages may not be awarded. The FCO may impose 
structural or behavioural remedies, and if legitimate interest exists, may declare that an 
infringement has occurred after it has been brought to an end, and may impose 
administrative fines.84 In 2006, the FCO fined TEUTO for violating a prohibition decision of 
July 2002.85 The FCO86 imposed a fine on the advertising time of marketing companies for 
two private broadcasting groups because of anti-competitive discount agreements that the 
marketing companies acting for the two companies concluded with media agencies, thereby 
foreclosing entry into the market. 
 
B. RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES OF THE FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE 
1. (Non-) Pricing Practices 
Different sale conditions are rare and difficult to prove. The difference between the actual 
and past market behaviour of competitors can indicate whether and to what extent a given 
market structure permits the expectation of prevailing substantial competition, and has to be 
appreciable.87 Metro was prohibited from forcing suppliers to retroactively adjust in its 
favour contractual terms that had been previously agreed, and from granting the most 
favourable prices.88 
(a) Predatory Pricing  
 
81 They acquired more than 90% of the demand volume of commercial lottery agents’ services in 2004, 
and therefore violated the prohibition of boycott of s 21 ARC. 
82 Pursuant to s 134 BGB (German Civil Code). 
83 Pursuant to s 33 ARC and s 823 BGB. 
84 FCO, Communication no 38/2006 on setting up the fines against undertakings and associations of 
undertakings according to s 81 (4) 2 ARC [2006]. 
85 FCO, press release, 9 May 2006. The fine amounted to € 250,000. 
86 FCO [2007] WuW 3 (2008), 279. The fine amounted to € 216 million (RTL € 96 million and Pro7Sat1 € 
120 million). The companies accepted the fines at the beginning of October 2007. 
87 FCJ Flugpreisspaltung [1999] WuW/E DE-R 375. 
88 FCO Metro MGE Einkaufs GmbH [1999] WuW/E DE-V 94.  
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Predation is not deemed an unfair hindrance per se; it is actually an essential element of 
healthy competition.89 In practice, only indirect evidence of predatory intent is required, and it is 
not necessary to establish whether the dominant company investigating such pricing had a 
realistic chance of recouping its losses. Thus, if a firm attempts to squeeze a competitor out of 
the market by means of such pricing behaviour, then, for it to be considered predatory, the 
respective practice has to be maintained over a certain period of time,90 or such an intention 
must at least be perceptible. 91 Evidence of consumer harm is not a prerequisite for finding 
predation, and separate evidence on the likely effects on competition is rarely needed. In 
contrast, in France Télécom,92 emphasis was placed upon whether the recovery of costs is 
possible, and upon predatory intent, which was presumed; furthermore, if prices are below 
average total costs (ATC), then the existence of a plan to eliminate competition has to be proven. 
Predation is presumed if the price demanded by the dominant undertaking is below its 
average variable costs (AVC). In Abwehrblatt II,93 unfair price-cutting was deemed predatory 
only where there was use of non-efficiency-based competition aimed at driving competitors 
out of the market and eliminating them. In Amtsanzeiger,94 the publisher of the sole local daily 
newspaper allegedly attempted to eliminate its rival’s advertising journal from the market by 
subsidising it from the profits earned from its daily. The Federal Court of Justice confirmed its 
previous case line since, by offering such a service below cost prices, the practice aimed in the 
long run, by virtue of its superior financial strength, to squeeze its competitors out of the market. 
Even a price below ATC may be an indicator of abuse. In Lufthansa/Germania,95 before 
Germania’s market entry, Lufthansa was the only airline operating on the Frankfurt-Berlin 
route. Germania offered one-way tickets for €99, similar to Lufthansa’s economy tariffs. 
Thus, Lufthansa reacted by a massive price reduction of its round-trip ticket of up to €285 
(from €485 to  €200), but replaced this offer later with a flexible one-way ticket priced at €105, 
clearly undercutting Germania’s price, as it included services which were not offered by 
Germania. The FCO’s investigations concluded that Lufthansa’s offer was clearly below its 
average operating costs per passenger on the Frankfurt-Berlin route. After deducting 
passenger fees and VAT, Lufthansa’s lower offer was equivalent to a net price of €62.24, with 
AVT of about €94.55 per passenger. The FCO found that, by meeting Germania’s prices, 
 
89 HRC Düsseldorf Kart 7/02 (V) Germania WuW DE-R 867-87; FCO B9-144/01 Deutsche Lufthansa AG 
Köln v Germania [2002] WuW 219.  
90 Ibid n 89. 
91 FCJ KZR 18/90 [1991] BGHZ 116, paras 47-60. 
92 Case T-340/03 France Télécom SA (formerly Wanadoo) v Commission [2007] 4 CMLR 21, para 197. 
93 FCJ Abwehrblatt II [1985] WuW/E 2195, 2196. 
94 FCJ Amtszeiger [1991] WuW/E BGH 2762.  
95 FCO B9-144/01 Deutsche Lufthansa AG Köln v Germania [2002] . 
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Lufthansa had undercut Germania’s offer, and therefore prohibited Lufthansa from 
demanding a price for flexible one-way tickets, which was less than €35 above Germania’s 
price. The only explanation for this pricing strategy is that it was an attempt to drive 
Germania out of the route and to recoup resulting losses at a later stage by discontinuing its 
price tariff and restoring previous ones. Lufthansa could impair emerging competition as a 
reaction to its rival by using a cut-price strategy that was intended to squeeze Germania out 
of the market. Otherwise, an economic analysis of the actual effects on consumers does not 
offer any evidence for an intervention. Thus, Germania was a newcomer and the 
intervention of the FCO was justified based on the aim of keeping market entry open to 
newcomers. 
In the cases mentioned above, in which indirect evidence of predatory intent could be 
assumed from the circumstances of the case, pricing below ATC, including variable, fixed and 
sunk or non-recoverable costs, is sufficient to denote abuse. It can also be argued that in both 
cases, the predatory intent is clearly a plan to eliminate a competitor, therefore a stricter cost 
measure would not have been necessary. 
(b) Cross-subsidisation 
Section 19 (1) refers to the abusive behaviour of a dominant undertaking that also occurs 
in “third” or neighbouring markets, where it is necessary to establish a causal link, even if 
the undertaking is not actually dominant and its alleged practices do not have the same 
negative effects.96 Cross-subsidisation is not considered an abuse per se. To establish whether 
Deutsche Post was able to dominate the third market of booklet delivery through its 
dominant position in the mail and catalogue delivery market, which was also the object of 
exclusive licensing, the court required direct evidence of effects on the dominated market.97 
The mere existence of cross-subsidisation in the third market, implying earnings from the 
dominated market, was not sufficient; other circumstances such as cut-pricing strategies 
were also necessary. The sole existence of the mail deliveries used for the delivery of 
booklets for advertisement purposes was not sufficient, as there was no evidence of abusive 
pricing. The possibility of hindrance abuse in a third market existed, but was denied in 
another case98 because there was no causal link between the undertaking in the dominated 
market and the alleged hindering conduct. The sole usage of delivery within the territory of 
exclusive licensing was not abusive and there was no cut-price strategy. 
 
96 S Hossenfelder, W Töllner and K Ost, Kartellrechtspraxis and Kartellrechtsprechung 2005/2006 (Köln, 
RWS Verlag, 21nd edn, 2006), para 229. 
97 HRC Frankfurt Fernsehzeitschrift [2005] WuW/E DE-R 1589. 
98 HRC Celle Einkaufsaktuell [2005] WuW/E DE-R 1592. 
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(c) Discounts and Rebates 
Loyalty or conditional rebates are prohibited per se. Other types of loyalty rebates are 
prohibited if they are not merely short-term marketing actions and have the effect of binding 
customers to the dominant undertaking and hindering competitors. Actual anti-competitive 
effects of rebates or bonus schemes are not required, only the mere likelihood of the conduct 
hindering the development of the competition still existing in the market. The incentive 
effect can only be established by an ex ante consideration, not based on actual market effects 
as the rebate system is an ex post consideration. 
Two major German private TV companies, Pro7Sat1 and the RTL Group,99 had each 
independently offered proportional advertising discounts to advertising agencies that spent 
large parts of their advertising budget with the respective broadcasting groups. By granting 
substantial discounts and other refunds, the access of smaller TV companies to the 
advertising market was foreclosed, as they could not afford to offer the same discounts as the 
two large companies. As discounts were granted retroactively for the entire budget, the 
media agencies had a strong incentive to place the respective proportions of their advertising 
budgets with these two companies. Thus, it was not the amount in excess of the discount 
thresholds that made market access more difficult, but rather the economic incentive effect. 
Moreover, retroactive quantity discounts themselves have a negative effect upon 
competition. 
(d) Exclusive Contracts 
Exclusivity clauses are not prohibited per se. While balancing the interests of the dominant 
undertaking with the interests of the undertaking that is bound by the exclusivity clauses, 
the market shares, duration, quantity bound, or the relation to the overall demand – for 
example, long-term gas supply concluded under exclusive agreements – are taken into 
account. The FCO’s Discussion Paper100 with regard to long-term gas supply contracts held 
that contracts between gas transmission and production companies and regional and local 
distributors for more than two but less than four years, and for supply quantities of more 
than 80% or between 50% and 80% of the respective consumer requirements, are prohibited. 
 
99 FCO press release, 11 November 2007. See DAF/COMP (2006) 21/01, 63. 
100 FCO B 8-113/03 Kartellrechtliche Beurteilungsgrundsätze zu langfristigen Gasverträgen, Bonn 25 
January 2005. Available on http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wDeutsch/download/pdf/ 
Diskussionsbeitraege/050125_DiskussionspapierGasvertraege.pdf accessed on 25 May 2008. 
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In E.ON Ruhrgas,101 the FCO found that 70% of the customers were tied to the dominant 
supplier through long-term contracts covering 100% of their demand. Moreover, a 
substantial part of the market (75%) where the dominant undertaking had its own gas 
distribution network was covered by such supply contracts. The higher percentage implies a 
stronger potential for market foreclosure, with detrimental effects upon competition in the 
market. Even if no safe harbours exist, exclusive dealing agreements entered into by a 
dominant firm, which have a long duration and cover a significant percentage of the 
requirements of the buyer/seller, are likely to have a market foreclosure effect. In Fleurop,102 
the court held that there was no objective justification for the differential treatment and 
hindrance of the selling partners under exclusive dealing agreements for the distance selling 
of flowers. Thus, the advantages acquired are likely to impede certain of the other partner’s 
advertising measures. 
2. Tying and Bundling 
The tying of products is considered to be abusive when a dominant undertaking bundles 
its products with those on the non-dominated market.103 It may be justified by technical 
requirements or as a short-term purchase incentive. For example, a price combination 
schedule improved the sales of the tied product on a “non-performance” basis by using the 
power of the tying product.104 Deutsche Telekom (DT) offered combined national phone line 
services and Internet access through its subsidiary T-Online. The price for the latter was 
based on the degree of use and did not include a minimum “by-call” tariff. AOL, another 
Internet service provider, claimed that T-Online had taken advantage of its dominant 
position in the primary market for network extensions in order to expand its presence in the 
aftermarket for Internet access. The combined tariff was a natural advantage, which the 
company could only acquire once, and was not tied105 because the offer did not oblige the 
customer to choose T-Online services. In contrast, the FCJ106 found that the combined offer 
could have been overly attractive, and hindrance in the third market could have been 
possible even if competitors were not present in the dominated market.107 
 
101 FCO B 8-113/03 E.ON Ruhrgas Essen AG [2006]. 
102 KG Blumendistanzhandel [2005] WuW/E DE-R 1595. 
103 FCJ Inter-Mailand-Spiele [1987] WuW/E 2406. 
104 KG HRC Berlin Preis Kombination [1977] WuW 1767. 
105 HRC Hamburg 3 U 68/01 AOL/Deutsche Telekom [2002]; Hossenfelder, supra n 96, para 238. 
106 FCJ Der Oberhammer KZ R1/03 [2004] WuW/E DE-R 1283. 
107 Hossenfelder, supra n 96, 240. 
The Analysis of Market Dominance and Restrictive Practices under German Antitrust Law in Light 
of European Antitrust Law                                                                                                         
20                                                                                                           
Previously, it had been necessary for the undertaking to be present in the dominated 
market.108 Nevertheless, the FCO held that every undertaking is basically free to make 
combined offers as long as this behaviour does not lead to the impairment of competition, 
particularly where a dominant undertaking expands its dominant position from one market 
to another by tying. There was no objective justification. The likelihood effects are essential, 
namely that the majority of customers in the neighbouring market would be lost. Having 
chosen T-Online, customers would probably not bother to switch to another Internet 
provider. 
Bundling appears when customers are offered other services together with mobile services 
as bonuses, such as free Internet minutes, air miles or purchase rebates. DT attempted to 
participate in the mileage bonus system of a leading German airline company in which its 
competitor had already been integrated, offering mobile transmissions services. The courts109 
refused its demand because DT’s ability to compete had to affect or even foreclose the 
competition in the market and not the competitor itself. The bundling of transmission 
services with the company’s mileage bonus was also justified by DT’s structural advantage 
in the market for phone line services where it held a dominant position, while its competitor 
had to “overtake” DT.110 
3. Refusals 
(a) Refusal to Deal 
The application of section 20 entails a particularly strong intervention111 in the business 
freedom of an undertaking to conclude contracts and choose parties to an agreement because 
it implies an obligation to deal. The core elements include dominance or at least superior 
market power (except in boycott cases),112 the likelihood of hindrance or foreclosure, and the 
absence of an objective justification or balancing of interests (the freedom of action of third 
parties against the freedom of undertakings to choose their own customers). 
Dominant undertakings are free to decide their sales strategies and with whom to deal. A 
car manufacturer granted its leasing firm preferential conditions, which it did not offer to 
 
108 FCJ Sonderungsverfahren [1988] WuW/E 2483, 2487. 
109 Regional Court Düsseldorf Bonusmeilen für Mobilfunkanbieter [2003] WuW/E DE-R 1135 upheld by 
HRC Düsseldorf U (Kart) 17/03 Bonusmeilen [2004]. 
110 Hossenfelder, supra n 96, para 242. 
111 K Markert in U Immenga and EJ Mestmäcker, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: GWB; 
Kommentar, (München, Beck, 3rd edn 2001), s 20, para 6, 754. 
112 S 21 (1) ARC contains a special provision against requests to refuse to supply “boycotts” that applies 
irrespective of the market power of the undertakings concerned. 
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other leasing firms.113 The FCJ held that the greater the market power of the supplier, the 
more restricted the possibility of refusal to deal. If the refusal results in a significant barrier 
to entry, it is unlikely to be justified.114 A dominant undertaking has to choose the means 
with the lowest possible hindrance effects in order to be capable of achieving its own 
interests.115 
An obligation imposed upon drug wholesalers to establish business relationships with the 
importer entailed a major interference with their contractual freedom. Thus, the general 
interest to open up the German pharmaceuticals market to more competition was superior to 
the wholesaler’s interests.116 There was no interest in protecting long-standing supplier-
buyer relationships, as the purpose of the ARC is to ensure performance-based 
competition.117 
RMS Radio Marketing118 refused to establish business relations with two local radio 
broadcasters that, as small competitors, were unable to sell on their own radio advertising 
slots and depended on RMS. RMS was found to be dominant in the affected market and to 
have marketed advertising slots to others while it discriminated against these two 
broadcasters. The FCO did not order to enter into any specified contract, leaving RMS free to 
negotiate the terms.119 An objective justification was denied when a phone directory refused 
to deal with an advertisement agency because the latter sought to reduce advertising prices 
to end-customers by rearranging previous contracts,120 or when a health insurance company 
refused to deal with a private provider of patient transport because it wanted to keep the 
market exclusively for public providers of patient transport.121 
(b) Refusal to Supply 
The termination of an existing supply relationship is less likely to be objectively justified 
than the refusal to start a supply relationship. It may be justified if a supplier reorganises its 
distribution system according to objective criteria and the retailer no longer meets these 
 
113 FCJ KZR 2/90 Aktionsbeiträge [1991]. 
114 FCO Krankentransportunternehmen I [1991]; FCJ Krankentransportunternehmen II [1991] WuW/E 
2707, 2714. 
115 FCJ Original-VW Ersatzteile II [1981] WuW/E 1829, 1832. 
116 FCO Importarzneimittel – Boykott [1992] WuW/E 2543. 
117 FCJ KVR 11/94 Importarzneimittel [1995] WuW/E 2990, 2294. 
118 FCO B 6-127/1999 RMS Radio Marketing [2001]. 
119 Upheld by HRC Düsseldorf 100, eins Radio Aachen [2003] WuW/E DE-R 1058; FCJ KVZ 7/03 RMS 
[2004]. 
120 FCJ KZR 17/03 Sparberaterin I [2004], upheld by FCJ KZR 2/04 Sparberater II [2005]. 
121 FCJ Krankentransportunternehmen II [1991] WuW/E 2707, 2714. 
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criteria.122 A refusal to supply is not justified by the mere fact that the supplier competes with 
a customer who has unlawfully copied his design.123 Such refusal amounts to discrimination 
and contravenes the aim of keeping markets open, as the dominant undertaking might also 
extend its position into the downstream market. 
(c) Refusal to Grant Access to “Essential Facilities” 
In Bewag,124 established network operators refused to grant access to the electricity 
network in Berlin due to lack of capacity, and hindered new entrants by charging a “transfer 
fee” to customers who signed a supply contract with another provider. Scandlines held a 
dominant position in the market for terminal facilities and the downstream market for ferry 
services, and refused to allow competing ferry companies’ access to the Puttgarden terminal 
despite payment of an adequate fee.125 Legal and physical barriers stood in the way of the 
construction of a new terminal in Puttgarden, whereas the shared use of existing terminal 
facilities by an additional ferry operator could not have been possible without modifications. 
While balancing Scandlines’ interest in having unlimited use of its own terminal against the 
applicant’s interest in starting up competing ferry operations, the decisive factor was the 
public interest in opening up the market to competition.126 
Mainova AG prevented two other energy providers that were dependent upon connection 
to its medium-voltage network from operating side network facilities or supplying end-
consumers with electricity generated by the company themselves or third-party suppliers.127 
The operation of side networks represented a newly emerging market in which Mainova 
attempted to eliminate competition from the outset. There was no objective justification for 
the refusal. Balancing the interests of the parties under the Energy Industry Act, which 
specifies a general obligation to connect and supply, there was no legal basis for Mainova to 
claim each new side network for itself by unfairly hindering its competitors. 
In Arealnetz, the FCJ128 held that it is sufficient that the concerned undertaking is dominant 
in the market for the allocation of the relevant essential facility, and that dominance in the 
downstream market is not required. The latter contradicts the legal context, pursuant to 
which the essential facilities doctrine within the meaning of section 19 (4) 4 may not apply 
 
122 FCJ Adidas [1981] WuW/E 1885, 1887. 
123 FCJ Lüsterbehangsteine [1988] WuW/E 2540. 
124 FCO B 8-99/99 BEWAG/RWE [1999] WuW/E DE-V 149. 
125 FCO B 9-199/97 and B 9-16/98 Puttgarden (Scandlines) [1999]; Deutsche Bahn, WuW/E DE-R 253. 
126 Overruled by the HRC Düsseldorf Kart 3/00 (V) Scandlines [2000] WuW/E DE-R 472; FCJ KVR 15/01 
[2002]. 
127 FCO B 11-12/2003 Mainova [2003], upheld by HRC Düsseldorf GETEC net [2004] WuW/E DE-R 1307. 
128 FCJ Arealnetz [2005] WuW/E DE-R 1520. 
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unless the requirement of dominance in the downstream market has been established 
according to section 19 (2). The owner or operator of the essential facility may not invoke as a 
defence their refusal to grant access because the allocation of the essential facility to 
competitors in the downstream market would impair the owner/operator’s market position 
in the relevant downstream market.129 
(d) Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights 
The exercise of intellectual property rights and licensing may be abusive if it has the sole 
purpose of hindering competitors. The sole ownership of exclusive licensing does not lead to 
the creation of an independent product market in the downstream market.130 The decisive 
factor is the fact that the use of the patent right is not substitutable for the intended purpose 
for technological reasons. A patent holder may be obliged to give a licence to competitors if 
access to a downstream market is impossible in the absence of a licence, if the licensed 
technology has become a de facto industry standard, and there are no objectively justified 
reasons for the refusal. Nevertheless, as long as a dominant company has no interest in the 
essential or normal functions of the property right, then the use of such a right against 
competitors might be abusive.131 Soda-Club was obviously interested not in a renting 
relationship, but merely in hindering its competitors in the aftermarket in order to 
compensate for its losses in the primary market.132 More restrictively, the court held that sole 
ownership is a means to restrict and distort the competition in the relevant market, and that 
it was maintained for anti-competitive purposes.133 
4. Hindrance Abuses and Discrimination 
Section 20 (3) ARC explicitly prohibits dominant undertakings from using their market 
position to cause other undertakings to grant them preferential terms in business activities 
without objective justification. Even if hindrance as market behaviour has objectively 
negative effects, it is not abusive per se; rather it has to be determined whether or not it could 
be objectively justified as competition on its merits.134 Hindrance includes unjustified 
differential treatment or discrimination.135 Deutsche Post hindered and discriminated against 
 
129 S 17 (3) of the Energy Industry Act enables the Federal Government to provide for balancing the 
interests against and in favour of granting network access through a regulation that should grant access to 
the upstream network primarily to site network facilities in the meaning of s 110 of the above Act. 
130 FCJ Standard-Spundfass [2004] WuW/E DE-R 1329 II. 
131 FCO B 3-39/03 Soda Club [2006], para 8. 
132 Ibid, para 37. 
133 HRC Düsseldorf VI-Kart-5/06 (V) Soda Club [2007], para 65. 
134 FCJ Original-VW Ersatzteile II [1981] WuW/E 1828. 
135 FCO B 8-77/00 Kraftstoffpreise [2000], reversed by HRC Düsselsdorf 6 U 103/01 Kraftstoffpreise 
[2001]. 
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a certain group of providers of postal services (mail consolidators in charge of collection and 
pre-sorting of letters);136 for example, it granted benefits that it had previously refused to 
another consolidator and refused consolidators access to partial services without objective 
justification (DP’s limited exclusive licence under the Post Act was not retained as 
justification). 
The concept of performance-based competition or “competition on the merits” is used to 
distinguish “abusive” from competitive behaviour.137 Accordingly, the conduct of a 
dominant undertaking constitutes an abuse if its behaviour is not based on its merits and the 
structural effects are substantial; for example, if the conduct leads to the destruction or 
serious impairment of the competition that exists in the dominated market. As the 
strengthening of a dominant position reduces the intensity of competition in the market, 
dominant undertakings must be subject to a higher standard of performance.138 Non-
performance competition that does not violate the unfair competition rules may fall under 
section 20 if it restricts competition in the dominated market.139 Combined advertising for 
two different newspapers,140 the use of a bonus rebate system for distributors141 or the use of 
fidelity rebates in an advertising campaign,142 did not qualify as competition based on their 
merits. 
Fuchs unfairly hindered its competitor Hartkorn, one of the few remaining medium-sized 
suppliers of spices.143 The FCO examined whether the freedom of economic activity of the 
dominated undertaking was unfairly hindered and whether, through its abusive behaviour, 
Fuchs achieved its own interests to the detriment of competitors due to its large market 
share, brand reputation and its own competitive advantage in the market.144 Praktiker, acting 
as franchiser vis-à-vis independent franchisees, unfairly hindered them by operating a dual 
 
136 FCO Deutsche Post AG Konsolidierer [2005] WuW/E DE-V 1025. Confirmed by HRC Düsseldorf 
Konsolidierer [2005] WuW/E DE-R 1473. 
137 P Ulmer introduced the test, having borrowed it from the German law of unfair competition, where it 
was introduced in 1930s. See P Ulmer, Schranken zulässigen wettbewerbsmarktbeherrschender 
Unternehmen (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1977). The first to define the concept was HC Nipperdey, in the 
context of “positive competition”, promoting the sales of a company by means of its own efforts, in 
contrast to hindrance. Later, it was referred to as competition off the merits 
(“Nichtleistungswettbewerb”). 
138 KG HRC Berlin Handpreisauszeichner [1969] WuW 995-1000. 
139 U Immenga and EJ Mestmäcker, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen: GWB; Kommentar, 
(München, Beck, 3rd edn 2001), 681-82. 
140 KG HRC Berlin Preis Kombination [1977] WuW 1767. 
141 KG Fertigfutter [1980] WuW/E 2402. 
142 HRC Berlin Rama-Mädchen [1978]; KG Rama-Mädchen WuW 1983. 
143 FCO B 2-12/00 Fuchs v Teuto [2002], para 38. 
144 Ibid, para 41. 
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distribution system and imposing an obligation to purchase goods from the system’s product 
range. The purchasing benefits gained from supplies to franchisees or associated companies 
were not passed on to the relevant franchisees.145 While balancing the interests, the generally 
positive competitive role played by franchising systems was considered and the FCO did not 
examine whether the system’s benefits remained solely with the franchisor, whereas the 
franchisor was the supplier/wholesaler and at the same time a competitor of his franchisees. 
In E.ON, the FCO held that the interest of E.ON Ruhrgas146 to secure the economic risk in the 
downstream market that resulted from the long-term supply contracts in the upstream 
market did not outweigh the interest to open up the energy market from foreclosing the 
vertical distribution agreements that perpetuated de facto monopolies. 
5. Economic Dependence  
The FCO examines whether the dependent undertaking has objectively sufficient and 
subjectively reasonable possibilities to deal with other undertakings, and whether it is in a 
position to obtain goods from alternative sources or to sell them through other distribution 
channels.147 
Undertakings that have been closely connected with each other, such as exclusive car 
dealers, are dependent because of long-standing relationships and economic difficulties.148 
Such an agreement may be terminated only within a reasonable termination period.149 
Lufthansa dominated the travel agencies market as an intermediary in the booking of flights 
and enjoyed a superior market power due to its turnover, market position and relationship 
with business clients.150 Therefore, travel agencies could not turn down Lufthansa’s flight 
bookings and purchasers depended on them. Contractual leasing dealers are not dependent 
upon producers of heavy goods vehicles as long as the leasing relationship has been 
developed in an independent manner and without granting exclusive deals in the relevant 
market segment.151 Vertically integrated undertakings that supply raw materials to non-
integrated undertakings are dependent upon them during times of scarce supply, such as an 
independent gas station that used to purchase from a vertically integrated oil company.152 
 
145 FCO B 9-149/04 Praktiker Baumärkte GmbH [2006]. 
146 FCO B 8-113/03 E.ON Ruhrgas Essen AG [2006], paras 30-3. 
147 Ditze supra n 42. 
148 FCJ BMW Direkthändler [1976] WuW/E 1455; FCJ KZR 20/86 Opel Blitz [1988] WuW/E 2491. 
149 FCJ [1995] Kfz-Vertragshändler WuW/E 2983; FCJ Opel-Blitz [1988] WuW/E 2491. 
150 HRC Düsseldorf VI-2 U (Kart) 3/04 Lufthansa-Provision [2004] in Hossenfelder, supra n 96, para 210. 
151 HRC Frankfurt/Main 11-U 60/03 Lkw-Leasing [2005] in Hossenfelder, supra n 96, para 211. 
152 KG [1974] WuW/E 1499. 
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A dealer depends upon a supplier of certain branded goods if it is necessary to remain 
competitive.153 The branded goods play a significant role in the dealer’s competitiveness due 
to their reputation, quality or price, regardless of whether comparable goods are already 
available.154 If sufficient possibilities exist, then the issue is whether switching to such 
alternatives is likely to create a substantial disadvantage for the dependent undertaking, and 
thus damage its competitiveness.155 Leading trade magazines enjoy superior market power 
in this market segment vis-à-vis their advertisers due to their reputation, coverage, brand 
awareness and audience.156 The franchisees obliged to purchase most of their product range 
during the term of the franchise agreement were dependent upon Praktiker.157 Dependence 
upon leading products158 or producers refers to branded goods or the products of a certain 
manufacturer that specialised retailers must be able to offer to their customers in order to be 
able to compete effectively.159 
 
C. FOLLOW-UP PERSPECTIVE FOR EC LAW: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The German economic freedom of competition approach is keen to ensure workable 
competition in the market by maintaining competitive market structures and therefore 
favours the likely restrictive market effects as prima-facie abusive behaviour on the structure 
of competition, and actual harm to consumers does not need to be proven. The difficulties of 
measuring market power due to a lack of economic data disappear as no causal link between 
the dominant position and the abusive behaviour needs to be shown. Furthermore, the 
existence of the legal criteria for assessing dominance and the refutable presumptions of 
dominance give the competition authorities fewer discretionary powers of market evaluation 
based on market shares. 
German ordoliberal thinking considers SMEs to be crucial to achieving the goal of 
enhancing consumer welfare, and therefore restrictions upon dominant undertakings’ unfair 
behaviour, such as below-cost prices, are prohibited. Thus, dominant undertakings are 
allowed to compete based on their merits. Because of the difficulties associated with 
accurately measuring the true extent to which particular anti-competitive conduct caused 
 
153 FCJ Nordmende [1979] WuW/E 1567. 
154 FCJ Rossignol [1975] WuW/E 1391. 
155 FCJ [1976] WuW/E 1429. 
156 HRC Düsseldorf VI-U (Kart) 32/04 Kosmetikmesse [2005]. 
157 FCO B 9-149/04 Praktiker Baumärkte GmbH [2006]. 
158 FCJ Designer-Polstermöbel [2000] WuW/E DE-R 481; FCJ Depotkosmetik [2003] WuW/E DE-R 1203. 
159 Düsseldorf HRC VI-U (Kart) 30/00 Rolex-Uhren [2003]. 
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harm to competition, the analysis of performance-based competition has become one of 
comprehensive balancing, using a case-by-case approach, of the harm caused to competitors 
against the expected benefits to society of the economic consequences. While balancing the 
interests of the parties, the economic freedom of competition and the aim of keeping the 
market entry open are considered paramount. Therefore, the reasoning of the FCO and the 
courts in the above case law tends to be legal rather than economics-based. However, the 
economic freedom-based approach does not aim at protecting SMEs’ competitors, but at 
avoiding foreclosure, with the aim of keeping market entry open. If we keep this 
argumentation in mind, this is exactly what is endeavoured at the European level. Thus, the 
requirement of less proven evidence and of insufficient economic analysis might give a 
rather legal shape to the German antitrust authorities’ reasoning. Moreover, due to a lack of 
economic rigour in the likelihood of effects, the decisions can usually be challenged before 
the courts, which weakens their legal certainty. 
However, a question still has to be answered: would the ARC lead to a better 
enforcement? All of these points lead to the conclusion that we are facing not only stringent, 
but also much more effective, provisions against anti-competitive behaviour of dominant 
undertakings. Under both German and EU antitrust law, the effects on competition and 
other competitors represent a decisive criterion for evaluating whether and to what extent 
certain conduct is abusive. In the medium and long term, it has to be determined in each case 
whether and to what extent possible benefit arises for the opposite side of the market and for 
consumers from a dominant undertaking’s behaviour. 
Under the German antitrust, objective justifications are restrictively interpreted and 
balanced to ensure that no entrepreneurial conduct, not even by a dominant undertaking or 
one with superior market power, is prohibited if it might not be abusive in its effects upon 
the market. Nevertheless, German jurisprudence demonstrates that balancing the efficiency 
gains with the negative effects of the restraint of competition can lead to less enforceability. 
The German rationale for the likelihood of effects is that, by driving competitors out of the 
market, competitive pressure disappears, and in the long run, this is to the detriment of 
consumers, as no efficiencies have been gained. If the supply structure in the market is 
narrowed, then it is likely that the innovation incentive will also be brought to a standstill. 
Reviewing the European Commission’s rationale160 for prohibiting or punishing powerful 
 
160 N Kroes, “Industrial Policy and Competition Law and Policy”, in Barry E. Hawk (ed), Annual Proceedings 
of the Fordham Competition Law Institute, (Huntigton and New York, Juris Publishing, 2007), 205. “An 
artificial interoperability advantage for a super-dominant player actually dampens the market’s incentive to 
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companies, both perspectives are convergent regarding the aim of preserving the incentives 
of firms to innovate. 
The argument is that by driving competitors out of the market it would be very likely to 
bring the incentive for enterprises to innovate to a standstill. Thus, less powerful enterprises 
also need freedom to perform their business strategies, even if these are not of benefit to the 
consumer. Otherwise, the interference grants assistance to smaller enterprises by helping 
them to “overtake” their competitors. To be more specific, the function of the so-called 
“Aufholwettbewerb” would assist them in developing to the detriment of the innovation 
incentive and the competitiveness of other undertakings that had previously been more 
active in the respective market segment. This “special” protection from the excess of market 
power applies merely to SMEs and newcomers who could be driven out of the market by 
powerful undertakings, and reveals a modern facet of German “ordoliberalism”. 
Of course, the idea that powerful undertakings should not unduly hamper smaller 
businesses is also reflected in the ECJ’s jurisprudence,161 which states that below-cost prices 
“can drive from the market undertakings which are perhaps as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking but which, because of their smaller financial resources, are incapable of 
withstanding the competition waged against them”. Hence, German jurisprudence allows 
for greater leeway, particularly in cases involving refusals to deal, while balancing the 
interests of the parties against the main policy goals of the ARC, and to a certain extent 
grants protection to SMEs. 
The main goal of opening up the markets to more competition is indeed the convergent 
perspective for both German and EC antitrust law. Thus, under the latter, this policy goal of 
protecting SMEs is attenuated by furthering the other EC Treaty objectives, such as market 
integration. In contrast, German ordoliberal thinking remains more pragmatically oriented 
towards competition based on merits, while the higher requirements for assessing 
dominance under Article 82 EC has made the abuse of dominance most unlikely to be 
proven. Thus, the growing use of effects-based analysis in recent cases162 demonstrates that 
 
innovate, since companies know that, however good their products are, they cannot compete on the merits of 
these products.” 
161 Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, para 72. 
162 See Case COMP/38233 Wanadoo Interactive [2003] OJ C 83 [2008], upheld by CFI in Case T-340/03 
France Télécom SA (formerly Wanadoo) v Commission [2007] 4 CMLR 21; Case T-339/04 Wanadoo v 
Commission, OJ C 262 [2004]; Case COMP/37792 Microsoft OJ L 32/25 [2007] upheld by CFI Case T-
201/04 Microsoft v Commission OJ C 269 [2007]. 
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the European Commission is also moving towards a modern economic thinking on 
predatory pricing or tying. 
The main divergence between German and EC antitrust law is the time perspective, 
wherein the competition authorities may interfere or intervene. The proposed EC approach 
allows for intervention when negative market effects have already emerged, but requires 
actual or likely effects upon consumer welfare to be proven, while for the German approach 
the likely harm to the structure of the market is paramount. Therefore, the German 
advantage of the likelihood of effects is preventing abuse at “the earliest stage”.163 
 
 
163 According to Dr Ulf Böge, abusive practice has to be prohibited “at the earliest possible stage”. See, eg U 
Böge, “The Role of Economics in Antitrust Enforcement – a German and European Approach” Speech 10 
March 2005, DAF/COMP (2005), 27. 
